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Abstract
It is argued that if an out−of−equilibrium player observing a deviation from a presumed
strategically stable path of play believes that a player also observing the deviation is more
likely to deviate than a player who does not observe the deviation then it is possible to
justify, in some extensive form game, the non−existence of a self−enforcing equilibrium.
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1. Introduction
According to van Damme (1991, p. 3), “the core problem of noncooperative game
theory can be formulated as: given a game with more than one Nash equilibrium, which
one of these should be chosen as the solution of the game?”. Many requirements have
been suggested to help in the task of equilibrium selection. One of them, applied to
extensive form games, is sequential rationality; see Kreps and Wilson (1982, pp. 870-
872). The idea motivating sequential rationality is that strategy profiles should also
prescribe payoff maximizing choices at unreached information sets. Specifically, a
sequentially rational equilibrium is an equilibrium such that, for every information set h
reached with probability zero when the equilibrium is played, there is a probability
distribution on  h making the strategy prescribed at  h a best reply to the strategies
prescribed at information sets going after  h. In particular, if  h is a singleton, a
sequentially rational equilibrium must dictate at h a strategy which is a best reply at h to
















Consider, for instance, game G1 of Figure 1, taken from Selten (1975, p. 33) and also
analysed in Kreps and Wilson (1982, pp. 870-871) and Kreps (1989, pp. 22-24). Profile
(a,  c,  e) is an equilibrium but it is not a sequentially rational equilibrium: if 2’s
information set is reached, it is d not c the best reply to e. Thus, if 1 expects 3 to choose
e and 2 to choose d when given the move, it would be better for him to select b instead
of  a. The conclusion is then that (a, c, e) is not self-enforcing. In fact, since self-
enforcingness is an informal (intuitive) notion, requirements like sequential rationality
contribute to make its meaning more specific. In this respect, consistency with
sequential rationality appears to be necessary for an equilibrium to be self-enforcing.
Notice finally that being a sequentially rational equilibrium is strictly less demanding-2-
that being a sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson (1982, p. 872)), which in his turn
is strictly less demanding that being a perfect equilibrium (Selten (1975, p. 38)).
It is plain that rejection of (a, c, e) relies on the presumption that 3 will not substantially
alter the probability with which he is expected to choose  e. In other words, it is
presumed that the occurrence of an event (1’s deviation) only (significantly) affects the
player who observes the deviation and not the player who ignores that it has occurred.
At a general level, this seems to be a sound and reasonable principle: is it not a player
who observes the unexpected occurrence of an event relevant for his strategy choice
more likely to reconsider his choice than a player who ignores its occurrence?
This note shows that this principle is capable of making all sequentially rational
equilibria of some game strategically unstable, in the same sense as sequential
rationality makes (a, c, e) strategically unstable in G1.
2. The game
Consider game G2 of Figure 2 and let s ˛ { a, c, e, g, h, j, k} simultaneously denote
action s and the probability with which s is taken.
Claim 1. In every equilibrium of G2, c = j = 1, 0 £ a £ 1/2, 0 £ e £ 1/3 and 0 £ g £ 1.
Proof. If a = 1 then 5’s best reply (BR) is j = 0, in which case a = 0 is 1’s BR. This
means that 2 is given the move with positive probability in every equilibrium. Suppose
c „ 1. When given the move, 2’s necessary condition for randomization is ej = 1/3
whereas, with c „ 1, 4’s is ej = 1/2. Thus, it cannot be that both 2 and 4 randomize. Case
1: g > k. Hence, e = 1 is 3’s BR. Case 1a: 2 randomizes but 4 does not. Since e = 1, ej =
1/3 yields j = 1/3, so g = 0 is 4’s BR and 3 does better by playing e = 0: contradiction.
Case 1b: 4 randomizes but 2 does not. Now, j = 1/2, c = 0 is 2’s BR and j = 0 becomes
5’s BR: contradiction. Case 1c: neither 2 nor 4 randomize. As g > k, g = j = 1, c = 0 is
2’s BR and j = 0 is 5’s BR: contradiction. Case 2: g < k. Then e = 0 is 3’s BR and 2’s BR
is c = 1: contradiction. Case 3: g = k. Since 2 and 4 cannot simultaneously randomize,
either g = k = 1 (so c = 1 is 2’s BR: contradiction) or g = k = 0 (so a = 1 is 1’s BR and 5
does better by playing k = 1: contradiction). In sum, given that no equilibrium of G2 has
c „ 1, the existence of some equilibrium in G2 implies c = 1. If j „ 1, a = 0 is 1’s BR.
This makes j = 1 the only BR for 5. To sustain j = 1 as a BR, 0 £ a £ 1/2 and to sustain c
= 1 as a BR, 0 £ e £ 1/3. As regards 4, he may ascribe any probability to g. QED-3-
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Claim 2. In every sequentially rational equilibrium of G2, c = h = j = 1, 0 £ a £ 1/2 and
0 £ e £ 1/3.
Proof. By Claim 1, in every equilibrium c = j = 1, 0 £ a £ 1/2 and 0 £ e £ 1/3, strategies
that are sequentially rational for players on the equilibrium path of play. To sustain 0 £
e £ 1/3 as a best reply at 3’s information set given j = 1 it must be that g = 0, which is a
best reply for 4 given j = 1 and any probability distribution over 4’s information set
assigning probability not greater than 1/2 to the upper node in 4’s information set. QED
A noteworthy implication of Claim 2 is that the probability with which player 4 chooses
g can be interpreted as the probability that he deviates from sequentially rational
equilibrium play, whereas the probability with which player 5 chooses  k can be
interpreted as the probability that he deviates from sequentially rational equilibrium
play. If it is accepted that being sequentially rational is necessary for an equilibrium to
be self-enforcing, then players should in principle expect h = j = 1.-4-
Suppose now that player 3 is given the move. He then faces a situation similar to player
1’s in G 1 when he plans to deviate from (a, c,  e): to which extent will the player
unacquainted with the deviation play as expected? It could be reasonably assumed that
players unacquainted with a deviation will stick to their expected choices. A weaker
principle will nonetheless be postulated, namely, that a player who does not observe a
deviation is less likely to reconsider his presumed choice than another player who does
observe it. In the case at hand, there is little trouble with defining likelihood that 4 and 5
reconsider their expected choices: since 4’s expected choice is h = 1, the probability that
3 attributes to g represents his assessment of the likelihood that 4 changes the expected
choice and, similarly, since 5’s expected choice is j = 1, the probability that 3 attributes
to k represents his assessment of the likelihood that 5 changes the expected choice.
Summing up, adoption of the above belief formation principle amounts for player 3 of
G2 to believe that g > k. If this is the case, the only best reply at his information set is e
= 1, which is part of no sequentially rational equilibrium. What is more: if 2 believes
that 3 adopts such principle to form beliefs then he will expect e = 1 and j very close to
1, in which case c = 0 is the only best reply at his information set, a strategy that is part
of no sequentially rational equilibrium. As a result, no sequentially rational equilibrium
of G2 is self-enforcing. What if the length of the hierarchy of beliefs is increased? If 5
believes 2 believes that 3 follows the above principle, j = 0 becomes his only best reply.
If 2 believes 5 believes 2 believes so, it would be better for him to return to c = 1. If 5
believes 2 believes 5 believes 2 believes so, he would be induced to change his choice
from j = 0 to j = 1... As a consequence, with common belief in the suggested belief
formation principle no sequentially rational equilibrium of G2 is strategically stable
1.
3. Discussion
There is a simple way to test the preceding conclusion: insofar as the event that 3 is
called upon to move has probability zero under the assumption that some equilibrium is
strategically stable, it is enough to observe that player 3 is at least once called upon to
move when players are put to play G2 several times.
                                                
1 Another way to justify e = 1 if 3 is called upon to move extends the argument used in the game of Figure
1 to sentence (a, c, e). Why not allowing a simultaneous reconsideration of strategy choices to all those
players observing the deviation, keeping the expected choices of the players that may play after the
deviation but who do not observe it fixed? This approach implies, for the game of Figure 2, that 3 and 4
must take b = d = j = 1 as given and then decide what to choose in the resulting induced game. In that
game, e is a weakly dominant choice for player 3.-5-
The crux of the matter is clearly how reasonable is to consider 4’s deviation from
sequentially rational equilibrium play in  G2 more likely than 5’s. If the reader is
convinced by the sequentially rational argument that (a, c, e) in G1 is not self-enforcing,
(s)he should not find unreasonable to hold that 4’s deviation could be considered more
likely than 5’s. After all, player 4 in G2 (like player 2 in G1) receives factual evidence
during the play that a deviation has occurred (so he can motivate a continuation of the
deviation on these grounds), while player 5 (like player 3 in G1) does not.
Moreover, if players are assumed to choose sequentially rational equilibrium strategies
unless they are furnished with factual evidence in the opposite or can prove (from the
information they possess) that others will not choose sequentially rational equilibrium
strategies, then the first player between 4 and 5 having a reason to reject his only
sequentially rational equilibrium strategy is 4, with 5 only justified in rejecting his after
having inferred that the situation faced by 2, 3 and 4 leads player 2 to defect.
Contending otherwise would lead to the possibility of sustaining (a, c, e) in G1 on the
grounds that 1 believes that 3 will recognize (having less factual evidence than 2) player
1’s deviation when it occurs.
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